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the Tokyo metropolis, she devotes a first contextualiz-
ing chapter to “World War One and the City Idea.” She
explains the importance of the wartime period as a gen-
uine turning point. It was at this “moment” that eco-
nomic development shifted from the nation to the cit-
ies. The sea change created new built environments
using novel materials and processes (e.g., concrete,
steel, electricity), a new if small middle class, and ten-
sions between new social groups (workers versus man-
agers, residents of the countryside versus people in first
cities, and the regional chronotope versus surrounding
hinterland).
Once Young establishes the profound shift around
1918, she delves into the distinctive characteristics of
interwar urbanization en route to answering her central
question: “How did the city become the center of mod-
ern economic and social life?” (p. 31). The question is
not simply answered, in that there are urban centers
and then there is Tokyo. Consequently, while Young
fittingly foregrounds the dynamic transformation in her
select group of chronotopes, she also discusses how
these national cities were peripheral bodies in an in-
escapable orbit around the new national capital.
In later chapters, Young moves to “urban biogra-
phy,” largely setting aside the Tokyo-periphery issue to
concentrate on how local people, some re-planted after
a stint in the capital, re-created Okayama, Kanazawa,
Niigata, and Sapporo as new cultural and social units.
She brilliantly captures the Janus-faced essence of the
project. Her careful depiction of various local-history
movements demonstrates the methods used to remake
the past to provide local identity and valorize local au-
thority (and authorities, dead and living). While this
new past was created and consumed at schools, memo-
rialized in local histories, and made materially manifest
at designated “famous sites and places” (meisho), a par-
allel project that associated the regional city with the
future went full-steam ahead. Young associates the in-
terwar re-creation of the regional city and modernity
through the lenses of the “exhibition boom,” at which
local Babbittry ran rampant as regional city boosters
spent lavishly to demonstrate that everything was up to
date in Kanazawa City and its counterparts. The effort
showcased the technology and regional economic ad-
vantages that inhered in the way modernity was being
popularly understood. This was a positive association
that was conjoined with anxieties about the “modern
girl” and the necessary tension between what future
changes might hold for the recently remade and usually
hagiographic urban biography.
Young’s sharpest, most convincing analysis is her
tracing of the influence of the local-history movement
and activities of literary leaders in Tokyo and in the
regional cities. Her comprehension of the texts and
teasing out of the significance of local histories and the
capacity of local cultural heroes to create new social
and cultural spaces reads like a satisfying mystery story.
The clues are there, but the story is not without twists
and turns; the end is unpredictable but convincing.
Telling the political story behind the new urban chro-
notopes is more difficult. In contrast to Young’s close
reading of the local-history and literary movements, her
perspective on second-city politics is formed from a
greater distance. This may be because the evidence for
explaining how individuals and group interacted to ef-
fect political change is often inconclusive. Young does
show us sweeping before-and-after political changes in
the four cities, but we seldom get close enough to see
who is acting politically on whom. Young also seems to
be somewhat of two minds about the importance of ge-
ography in influencing politics. In places she suggests
that geography fixed the limits of the possible and set
political parameters, but in her concluding chapter she
argues for the importance of local agency. I prefer her
final thoughts on this issue. Geographical determinism
probably reached its end as new technologies became
capable of overcoming environmental barriers. At a
certain point, for example, the mountains and rivers of
the “backside of Japan” (ura Nihon) probably became
more of an excuse for ignoring one region than a gen-
uine explanation of what could or could not be done.
Young’s deeply layered work combining cultural and
urban history is a remarkable achievement that fills in
some of the blank parts of Japan’s modern historical
map. Beyond the Metropolis deserves a wide readership
as a fundamental text on which others will surely rely
in building a history of modern urbanization beyond
Tokyo.
MICHAEL LEWIS
University of Sydney
YUKIKO KOSHIRO. Imperial Eclipse: Japan’s Strategic
Thinking about Continental Asia before August 1945.
(Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Co-
lumbia University.) Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press. 2013. Pp. xvi, 311. $39.95.
In Imperial Eclipse, Yukiko Koshiro argues that “[u]n-
der the US military occupation, the Pacific War nar-
rative eclipsed Japan’s Eurasian worldview and pro-
duced Japan’s postwar amnesia about its colonial
empire.” Aiming to “restore the comprehensive land-
scape of Japan’s war,” Koshiro “returns the Soviet
Union to the scene and renames the conflict the Eur-
asian-Pacific War” (p. 1).
The book’s central argument is that toward the end
of the war, “Japanese war planners concluded that the
Soviet Union had significant connections with regional
nationalists that could help check US hegemonic am-
bitions in East Asia,” and “[t]hey hoped that Soviet
presence in the region would achieve a desirable bal-
ance of power vacuum created by the fall of Japan’s
empire” (p. 2). The first two chapters suggest the for-
gotten yet substantial presence of Russians in Japan,
and Japan’s historical affinity to it. The following two
chapters demonstrate that in the early stages of the war
with China, Japanese military officers and diplomats
were getting accurate information on the strength of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its tensions with
the USSR, and their respective influences in Korea.
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The next three chapters, on the process of ending the
war, argue that these officers and bureaucrats knew that
the USSR would eventually join the war and attack Ja-
pan.
While Koshiro has consulted extensive diplomatic
and military archival and reprinted documents, a large
part of her analysis is based on intelligence documents
created by the Japanese army units on the continent,
and to a lesser extent in Korea, as well as materials from
the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Imperial
General Headquarters (IGHQ), and military orders to
the garrisons in China. This part is a fascinating read,
which reveals the details of war situations on the con-
tinent, and the extent and depth of Japan’s intelligence
operations in the area.
How were, however, these intelligence materials
used for decision-making? Were key Japanese military
officers, especially in the army, and other policymakers
so ready to view these communist forces favorably,
rather than regarding communism as one of the biggest
threats to Japan’s national security, along with the Al-
lied attacks? In the desperate last moment of the sur-
vival of their nation, were they in a position to decide
not to put up a strong resistance against the USSR’s
advance on the Manchurian and North Korean fronts,
based on a calculated grand vision for the postwar order
in Northeast Asia? Indeed, there were some, especially
Takagi Sokichi, who expressed such a postwar vision in
March 1945 (pp. 182, 202). It is unclear, however,
whether this view was dominant in the decision-making
process at the Supreme Council for the Direction of
War (Saiko senso shido kaigi) in August. The book sug-
gests that one particular action taken by Foreign Min-
ister Togo Shigenori—his deliberate delaying of a
meeting with the Soviet ambassador, Yakov Malik (p.
240)—may have been key to answering some of these
questions, but the author does not elaborate on this.
Her main theme, therefore, will pose a further debating
point in the view of recent works on the Cold War in
Asia, as well as new scholarship according the USSR a
more significant role in the Pacific War than was pre-
viously thought.
Koshiro also makes a few important points on the
scholarship of modern Japanese history. She argues
that until recently the “Pacific War” was examined pre-
dominantly from the perspective of the relationship be-
tween the U.S. and Japan, and she rightly points out
that this resulted in Japan’s amnesia about its colonial
past, or more precisely Japan’s unfulfilled moral re-
sponsibility not only to the Allied countries, but also to
those in Japan’s and Allies’ colonies in Asia and the
Pacific region. It is for precisely this reason that
Kurasawa Aiko, among others, has argued that what is
commonly called the Pacific War is a part of a broader
war, the Asia-Pacific War (Ajia Taiheiyo Senso). It
would have been good to know how Koshino under-
stood Kurasawa and others’ argument.
The book reinforces another critical point, made by
John Dower and Sheldon Garon: that there has been a
gap between English-language-based scholarship on
modern Japanese history, which was previously domi-
nated by the modernization theory, and Japanese-lan-
guage-based scholarship, which was written mostly in
the Marxist framework. This once-significant gap is nar-
rowing as more diverse angles are evident on both sides,
and more scholars are integrating scholarship in both
languages. Works like this book will enhance this trend,
making the scholarship even richer and fuller.
Three last important points should be made. First,
Koshiro’s statement about the “ultimate power” to be
given to the Supreme Council for the Direction of War
(p. 3) needs to be qualified, as Ito Takashi elaborates
in “Kaisetsu” (in Ito Takashi and Takeda Tomoki, eds.,
Shigemitsu Mamoru: Saiko senso shido kaigi kiroku,
shuki [2004], pp. 371, 373, 374, 377, 378). Second, cer-
tain confusion in her understanding of the organiza-
tional structure can be detected in her use of the names
of the offices in charge of civilian intelligence activities.
Koshino uses the term “the Cabinet Information Bu-
reau” for Naikaku johobu (pp. 43, 44, 99, 109, 112, 113).
It is normally translated as “the Cabinet Information
Department,” which was created in September 1937 to
succeed the Cabinet Information Committee. She de-
scribes Joho kyoku as “the Intelligence Bureau . . . of
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (p. 48). It is
normally translated as “the Board of Information,” and
it was not a part of the MOFA. The Board of Infor-
mation was created in December 1940 as a part of Ko-
noe’s administrative reform. It was intended to expand
the capacity of the Cabinet Information Department.
While it absorbed the Department of Information of
the MOFA, and became the clearinghouse for civilian
intelligence, its duties went beyond the area of civilian
intelligence, and encompassed the areas of diverse in-
formation-related activities, such as propaganda and
the national spiritual mobilization movement. Third, a
bibliography at the end, with all the key primary sources
and select secondary sources, would have been useful
for readers.
TOMOKO AKAMI
Australian National University
AARON STEPHEN MOORE. Constructing East Asia: Tech-
nology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan’s Wartime Era,
1931–1945. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
2013. Pp. xii, 314. Cloth $55.00, e-book $55.00.
Historians interested in how science and technology
shaped Japan and its wartime empire have been re-
warded with a handful of excellent studies published
over the past five years by Yang Daqing, Janis Mimura,
and Mizuno Hiromi. Aaron Stephen Moore’s book
adds to this illustrious canon. Moore argues that tech-
nology was “much more than simply advanced machin-
ery and infrastructure” (p. 6). Rather, “it included a
subjective, ethical, and visionary dimension” (p. 6) and
“constituted a widespread force of rationalization” (p.
5). Moore documents how technology—described by
his oft-employed phrase “technological imaginary”—
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